Impressions of force are commonplace in the visual perception of objects interacting. It is proposed that these impressions have their source in haptically mediated experiences of exertion of force in actions on objects. Visual impressions of force in interactions between objects occur by a kind of generalization of the proprioceptive impression of force to interactions between objects on the basis of matching to stored representations of actions on objects carried out by the perceiver. Such experiences give rise to a distinctive perceptual interpretation of interactions between objects as involving force exerted by one object acting against resistance offered by the other object. Active, moving objects are seen as exerting force; inactive objects are seen as offering varying degrees of resistance and not as exerting force unless there is reason to think that they acted back on the active object. The results of 3 experiments in which people viewed simple animations of objects colliding and made judgments of force and resistance supported several predictions made by this account.
Try pressing a few keys on your computer keyboard. What do you experience? Very likely, part of the experience is of imparting force to the keys. Now observe someone else doing the same. What do you perceive? If you are close enough to observe the movement of the keys, very likely part of the perception will be an impression of force being applied to the keys by the person's fingers: You do not merely observe motion and contact, but also the fingers doing something to the keys by applying force to them. Now observe a small but heavy object being dropped onto the keyboard. What do you perceive? Again, I would guess, part of the perception is an impression of force being exerted by the object on the keys it contacts.
There is one striking difference between the first case and the other two. In the first case, the experience of force is primarily mediated proprioceptively; it comes through skin pressure sensors and articular kinesthesis. A central claim of this article is that the visual impression of force in the other two cases occurs by a kind of generalization of the proprioceptive impression of force to interactions between objects that resemble actions we have carried out on objects ourselves. Note also that the experience of force seems to be only one way. We exert force on the keys but we do not ordinarily experience the keys as exerting force on us: At most, the keys may be experienced as offering some degree of resistance to the force we apply to them. This is another central feature of the present account; that, instead of the symmetry of forces stipulated in Newton's third law of motion, we experience an asymmetry of forces when we act on objects, and that asymmetry is also generalized to our visual perception of objects interacting, when one of the objects in the interaction is identified as active and the other as inactive.
Consider an interaction between a moving object (A) and an initially stationary one (B), in the manner of billiard balls on a billiard table. Object A moves toward Object B in a straight line at constant speed and contacts Object B, whereupon Object B starts moving and Object A stops. This is a general description of the kind of stimulus presented by Michotte (1963) . It is well established that, if B's motion after contact is not greater than A's motion before contact, if the two objects both move in the same direction, and if there is no perceptible delay between A contacting B and B starting to move (and given some other conditions found to be important by Michotte) , then observers of this stimulus reliably report an impression that Object A causes Object B to move (Gordon, Day, & Stecher, 1990; Michotte, 1963; Natsoulas, 1961; Schlottmann, Ray, Mitchell, & Demetriou, 2006; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) . The impression is qualitatively specific: Object A is perceived as kicking or launching Object B, and not as pushing it or pulling it. The impression is known as the launching effect, and I shall refer to stimuli with features that usually give rise to the launching effect as launching-type stimuli.
In addition to the qualitative impression of causality, there is also an impression of force. White (2007) found that Object A was judged as exerting more force on Object B than Object B exerted on Object A. Ratings of force exerted by B on A were consistently close to zero on the rating scale, even when Object A reversed direction after contacting Object B. This perceptual impression is inconsistent with Newton's third law of motion, which states that the force exerted by B on A is equal and opposite to the force exerted by A on B. The momentum gained by one object is equal to the momentum lost by the other object. Putting it colloquially, it would be as valid to say that Object B makes Object A stop moving as it is to say that Object A makes Object B start moving. But no observer of the typical launching effect stimulus has ever I owe a special debt of gratitude to the late Alan Milne, who designed the software used to create the stimuli, collaborated on earlier research on this topic, and was unfailingly and selflessly helpful and generous with his time. I hope he had some idea of how much he was appreciated. I am also grateful to Trevor Price for advice on the laws of mechanics, to Raffaella Carta for acting as experimenter, and to Lorraine Woods for assistance with Figure 1 .
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Peter A. White, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Tower Building, Park Place, Cardiff CF10 3YG, Wales, United Kingdom. E-mail: whitepa@ cardiff.ac.uk reported an impression that Object B makes Object A do anything (Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann et al., 2006) . This error has been called the causal asymmetry (White, 2006 (White, , 2007 . White (2007) also found that the amount of force Object A was judged to be exerting on Object B varied depending on how fast Object A was moving before contact and on how fast Object B moved after contact, but not on how fast Object A moved after contact. So three phenomena occur together in perception of this stimulus: the qualitative impression of launching, the causal asymmetry, and the influence of some variables but not others on the quantitative impression of force exerted by Object A on Object B. I shall propose a hypothesis to account for these phenomena and test some predictions of this hypothesis for the ways in which judgments of force exerted by objects are influenced by stimulus variables.
As a first approximation, the launching effect and perceived force can be regarded as qualitative and quantitative aspects of a unitary impression of causality. Michotte (1963) never asked observers to rate the degree of strength in the launching effect, and indeed did not regard it as admitting of degrees. It might be more or less distinct under different conditions, but it was basically treated as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. It is, however, qualitatively specific: Launching can be distinguished qualitatively from other visual impressions of causality, such as pulling (White & Milne, 1997) . In principle any specific kind of causality could be regarded as operating with varying degrees of force, so force refers principally to the quantitative dimension of perceived causality. This issue is further addressed in the General Discussion.
The mechanoreceptor hypothesis: Actions on objects serve as a model for perception of forces in launching-type stimuli.
Interactions between objects are addressed by a branch of physics called mechanics. The laws of mechanics generate descriptions of interactions between objects in terms of dynamically relevant variables such as forces, masses, velocities, and deformation. It would be most useful if we had a sensory system that detected the mechanics of interactions, enabling us to perceive forces. In fact we do have such a system. It is the haptic system, specifically that part of the haptic system that functions as a mechanoreceptor system (Gibson, 1966) . This mainly comprises articular kinesthesis and skin pressure receptors.
Research on the haptic system has tended to focus on perception of object properties and haptic illusions (Amazeen & Turvey, 1996; Bushnell & Boudreau, 1993; Charpentier, 1891; Heller, Joyner, & Danfodio, 1993; Jouen & Molina, 2005; Lederman & Klatzky, 1993; Molina & Jouen, 2003; Over, 1968; Sann & Streri, 2008; Solomon & Turvey, 1988; Solomon, Turvey, & Burton, 1989; Vogels, Kappen, & Koenderink, 1996) . But the haptic system can be used not merely to ascertain properties of objects but also to learn what can be done to objects, and what is going on when one does something to an object. Forces are detected through the mechanoreceptor system, just as shapes and colors and kinematics of objects are detected through the visual system.
In this respect the key feature of the haptic system is the relative directness of haptic perception because of the fact that, unlike other sensory systems, it is in direct physical contact with the objects of perception (Gibson, 1966; Michaels & Carello, 1981) . The crucial point is encapsulated in this quotation from Gibson (1966) : "The extremities are exploratory sense organs, but they are also performatory motor organs; that is to say, the equipment for feeling is anatomically the same as the equipment for doing" (p. 99, emphasis in original). When we act upon an object, we simultaneously receive information about our action and the object upon which we act through the haptic system. We receive articular kinesthetic information relating directly to the muscular and skeletal involvement in the action, we receive skin pressure sensory information from the points of contact between the hand and the object, and there is continual coordination between the motor activity and the perceptual feedback as the interaction proceeds. Thus, through the mechanoreceptor system we perceive the mechanics of interactions between ourselves and the objects on which we act, primarily through experiences of exertion and resistance. We may not be certain whether the object we are touching is rough or smooth, but we are in no doubt that we are touching it and, when we act on it, that we are exerting force on it.
I am not postulating direct perception of forces through the mechanoreceptor system. The mechanoreceptor system has the advantage that it is in direct physical contact with the objects of perception, which the visual system is not. But information picked up about forces through direct physical contact is still mediated by the peripheral nervous system and processed by the central nervous system, resulting in a constructed representation. While the likelihood of being in error about whether one is interacting with an object or not may be small (compared to likelihoods of error in visual perception), it is not zero. Similarly, while the mechanoreceptor system may allow high levels of accuracy in haptic perception of forces exerted in actions on objects, accuracy in such perception is not guaranteed, and impressions of force are still perceptual constructions. In fact I shall be arguing that these perceptual constructions do not accurately reflect the reality of forces, because they embody a perceptual distinction that does not correspond to any distinction mandated by the laws of physics.
The mechanoreceptor hypothesis states that experiences of forces involved in actions on objects form lasting representations that can function as schemas against which perceptual input of other kinds may be matched on the basis of resemblance in salient features. These stored representations are not exclusively haptic; they combine haptic and salient visual features. Actions on objects are usually visually attended, so that a typical representation possesses haptic and visual features coordinated over the time course of the event. For force perception in the case of visually perceived interactions between objects, the relevant features for matching purposes are kinematic properties of the objects involved. These are matched against kinematic features of stored representations of actions on objects. If a match is found then the stored representation is adopted as the perceptual interpretation of the interaction, and additional features of the stored representation become part of the perceptual interpretation. Forces cannot be visually perceived. But if a schema to which the kinematic features of the interaction are matched specifies the forces that are involved, then that force specification becomes part of the perceptual interpretation of the interaction. In a sense, a visually perceived interaction between two physical objects comes to be perceived as if it were an action on an object, at least in terms of the forces attributed to it. The identities of the objects (at least within reason) are not relevant to this schema-matching process: One does not see an object such as a billiard ball as a person, or as having mental states. But one does see it as performing something like an action, in terms of the forces that are judged to be involved.
Any kind of action on an object could be formative for an understanding of forces exerted in interactions. The kind of action on an object that is the nearest equivalent to the launching-type stimulus is a simple push, blow, or kick administered to an inert, stationary object with the hand or foot. Infants are capable of performing such actions (Bushnell & Boudreau, 1993) , so their experiences of such actions (among others) could be formative for the understanding and perception of forces in interactions between objects.
It might seem plausible to argue that, if forces are perceived through the mechanoreceptor system, the perception and understanding of interactions would conform to Newton's third law, because we would experience forces exerted by objects on us as well as forces we exert on objects, and part of that experience would be the symmetry of forces. In a sense, we do experience the forces exerted on us by objects when we exert forces on them, but in most cases we do not experience them as forces. I shall argue that the behavior of objects may be interpreted in one of two ways, as action or as not action; and that interpreting the behavior of an object as not action results in a kind of understanding that deviates from equal and opposite forces in two respects, namely perceiving the interaction in terms of force acting against resistance rather than force against force, and perceiving force and resistance as unequal.
The two kinds of behavior may be called inactive or inertial behavior, and active or reactive behavior. The latter kind is specific to self-propelled entities, that is, entities with an internal energy source that can power behavior by the entity. Let me take a simple push as a paradigm case of an action on an object, an interaction extended over a short period of time. A self-propelled entity, such as a human being, can push back against the actor, causing displacement of the actor's extremity. For example, a push with the foot can be countered with a push that pushes the actor's foot back in the direction from which it came. Self-propelled entities do not always exhibit this kind of behavior, of course; what matters is that they do exhibit it sometimes. (It is perhaps particularly common in infancy, when physical contact with other human beings is a frequent occurrence.) Non-self-propelled entities do not do this. I am not proposing that this difference is fundamental to the infant's understanding of and differentiation between self-propelled and non-self-propelled entities, or that between animate and inanimate entities. I am proposing only that it is a critical difference for the perception of forces.
There is a qualitative difference between action generated by a self-propelled entity and inertial or inactive behavior of any kind of entity. This qualitative difference marks the difference between what we experience as force and what we experience as resistance. It is registered in two ways. The action of a self-propelled entity is essentially unpredictable and therefore tends to result in a perceived discrepancy between haptically (and visually) mediated feedback about the disposition and motion of the actor's extremities with that encoded in the forward model for the action being executed. And the action of the self-propelled entity is recognized as an action and as involving the active exertion of force by a matching process; inactive behavior is not recognized as such. I shall briefly discuss each of these.
It has been proposed that, in the process of executing an action, the actor constructs a mental model of the intended action or its consequences, called a forward model (Blakemore, 2003; Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 2002; Haggard, 2005) or, in more general terms, a model of the predicted state of the world (Gray, 1995) . This model predicts the sensory consequences of the planned movement and these predictions can be compared with actual sensory feedback. One effect of this comparison is "to cancel the sensory effect of the motor act, attenuating it perceptually compared with identical stimulation that is externally produced" (Blakemore, 2003, p. 648) . One outcome of this, when acting on objects, is that the force exerted by the object on the actor is perceptually attenuated so long as the comparison activity shows that the course of the action is consistent with the representation in the forward model. Attention is drawn to the force exerted by the object only when a mismatch is detected between the action performed and the representation of the action in the forward model. This happens when a selfpropelled object acts back against the actor. The consequence is that the displacement of the affected parts of the actor's body, compared to the forward model, is experienced as the effect of an external force acting on the actor's body.
The forward model accounts for misperception of forces. When there is no mismatch between action and representation, the force exerted by the actor on the object is perceived as greater than the force exerted by the object acted on because of the perceptual attenuation of the force exerted by the object. But this alone does not account for the fact that the object is experienced as offering resistance rather than exerting force. Mismatches between the representation in the forward model and the course of the action also occur when an inactive object behaves in an unexpected way, for example because it is more massive than anticipated. Under this circumstance, misperception of the relative forces exerted by actor and object would be reduced, if not eliminated, but the object is still perceived as offering resistance, not as exerting force on the actor.
The active behavior of self-propelled entities is interpreted as action by means of a matching process, the salient feature of which is that kinematic properties of the observed behavior are matched to stored representations of actions carried out by the actor. It is possible that such matching is mediated by mirror neurons Nystrom, 2008; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) . Whether mirror neurons are involved or not, evidence has been found for the occurrence of matching in humans (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003) . The actor's own actions are understood as involving the exertion of force; this knowledge is given in experiences mediated by the mechanoreceptor system. Therefore, if perception of similar actions by others draws on a common motor representation, the actions of others will be understood as involving the exertion of forces, just as one's own actions are. There is evidence that this kind of understanding emerges in the first year of life. Saxe and Carey (2006) showed that 7-monthold infants understand that animate entities do things to inanimate entities, rather than the other way around. Infants' personal experience with actions facilitates understanding of the same actions carried out by others (Sommerville, Hildebrand, & Crane, 2008) .
Therefore, the behavior of non-self-propelled objects (and of self-propelled objects when inactive) is interpreted as involving resistance rather than the exertion of force precisely because it lacks the features that would lead to it being matched to the motor representation of an action. The experienced difficulty in moving (or in any other way acting on) an inactive object, experienced in terms of the amount of force required by the actor to bring about the desired result, is what I am calling resistance. The object is not experienced as exerting force because its behavior is not matched to a motor representation of action, but acting on it still involves a degree of difficulty, of exertion. This is the experience of resistance. Evidence that people do not interpret motionless objects as exerting forces, such as walls when actors push against them, and plates resting on tables, is consistent with this (Clement, 1987; diSessa, 1993; Gutierrez & Ogborn, 1992) . As it is understood by humans, force is related to (self-propelled) activity, resistance to inactivity.
Implications for Perception of Objects Interacting
In a typical launching effect stimulus, Object A is active, engaged in apparently self-propelled motion, and Object B is stationary, apparently inactive. I therefore propose that the perception of such interactions, in particular the perception of forces and resistances in such interactions, is governed by a tendency to assimilate or match the stimulus to the motor representation of an action on an object. The matching activity is governed by resemblance of perceived kinematic features. The kinematic features of a launching-type stimulus are matched against those of an action on an object, and this determines the perceptual impression of forces in the launching event. The active object is matched to the actor and the inactive object is matched to the object acted upon, so that the active object is perceived as exerting force on the inactive object, and the inactive object is perceived not as exerting force on the active object but as offering resistance to it.
There is evidence to support the claim that infants assimilate the motion of the active object to the motor representation of an action. Infants aged 5 months attribute goals to inanimate boxes if they are engaged in self-propelled motion and do not tend to do so if the motion has a possible external cause (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005) . At 6 months infants attribute goals to inanimate objects if they display variable or unpredictable behavior (Csibra, 2008) . At that age infants are probably still learning about where to draw the line between animate and inanimate objects, but if they can attribute goals to inanimate objects then it is probable that they can interpret the behavior of inanimate objects as action when it is (or seems to be) self-propelled. This tendency appears to persist into adulthood. Michotte (1963) commented that observers of launching stimuli had a strong tendency to talk of what they perceived in terms of human actions on objects, with Object A perceived as actor and Object B perceived as object (or other person) acted on. And the ease with which observers interpret the motions of simple geometric forms as the actions of animate beings (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) further supports the contention that observed object motions tend to be spontaneously assimilated to motor representations.
In the perception of forces, then, there is a categorical distinction between interactions in which one object is active (moving) and the other is inert (stationary) prior to contact, and interactions in which both objects are in motion. In the former case the interaction is perceived as the active object exerting force on the inactive object, which offers some degree of resistance to that force. In the latter case, both objects are perceived as exerting force on each other. This distinction is not recognized in the laws of mechanics: In both cases the objects are exerting forces and the same equations relating dynamic to kinematic properties apply.
Derivation From the Mechanoreceptor Hypothesis of
Predictions for Perceptual Impressions of Interacting Objects
Take first the case where one object (A) is in motion prior to contact and the other object (B) is stationary, exemplified by the launching-type stimulus. In terms of force, this is perceived as Object A exerting force on Object B and Object B offering resistance to Object A. The interaction is perceived as a contest between the force exerted by Object A and the resistance offered by Object B; the outcome of the contest is determined by the relative amounts of force and resistance involved. Inverting this, the perception of relative force and resistance depends, at least in part, on the outcome. If Object B does not move, then the amount of resistance offered by Object B will be perceived as greater than the amount of force exerted by Object A. If Object B moves, then the amount of force exerted by Object A will be perceived as greater than the amount of resistance offered by Object B. In the case where Object B does not move after contact, however, it is still not perceived as exerting force on Object A. Ratings of resistance offered by Object B should therefore be higher than ratings of force exerted by Object B.
There are four kinematic parameters of an interaction between two objects, A and B: velocity of A prior to contact (hereafter vA before), velocity of B prior to contact (vB before), velocity of A after contact (vA after), and velocity of B after contact (vB after). How does each of these contribute to the perception of force exerted by Object A and the perception of either force or resistance on the part of Object B? In the laws of mechanics these parameters contribute equally to the computation of forces. But the mechanoreceptor hypothesis gives reasons for thinking that the four kinematic parameters do not contribute equally to the perception of force and resistance.
In the case of actions on objects, the amount of force exerted by the actor is experienced directly through the actor's knowledge of the motor commands issued to the parts of the body involved in the action and through perception of the movement of those parts of the body in executing the action, mediated by the mechanoreceptor system. This is therefore the primary determinant of the actor's knowledge of the amount of force exerted by their own body on the object acted on. Actors do not look at their own actions when they are approaching an object; instead, they look at the object (Land, 2006) . They do this because the mechanoreceptor system provides the requisite information about what the body is doing, so that visual information about the body's movement is not required. 1 The term resistance has a meaning in physics, where it concerns the interaction between a moving object and a medium through which it moves, such as the flow of electrons in a wire or the effect of motion through air on the trajectory of a projectile. In the present account the term resistance has a different meaning, specifically the perceptual construct concerning the behavior of an inactive object when it is acted on by the actor or by another object. This perceptual distinction between force and resistance does not correspond to any distinction in the laws of mechanics.
Perception of interactions such as launching-type stimuli is different from experience of one's own actions on objects because haptically mediated information about the force exerted by Object A is not available. When Object A contacts Object B, the visual information that could suffice for inference of force is available, because the motions of the objects before and after contact can specify their relative masses, from which relative momentum could be derived (Runeson, 1983) . Objectively, all four velocity components are involved in this. But under the hypothesis that launching-type stimuli are interpreted by matching to representations of actions on objects, what matters is not the derivation of mass as an intermediate step to inferring force, but the exertion by Object A, what Object A brings to bear on Object B that produces an outcome for Object B. In ordinary actions the outcome for Object B is determined by a temporally extended action in which the actor overcomes the object's resistance, not because of the object's mass but because of the exertion the actor puts into producing the outcome in the temporally extended contact. If this kind of representation is used for force perception in launchingtype events, then the force exerted by Object A on Object B is inferred primarily from the behavior of Object A prior to contact and the outcome for Object B after contact: The outcome for Object B is an indicator of what Object A is putting into the interaction by exerting force. The motion of Object A after contact, and that of Object B prior to contact, are not relevant to this. So the mechanoreceptor hypothesis predicts that the main determinants of judged force exerted by Object A in a launching-type stimulus will be vA before and vB after, and vA after should have little or no effect.
When both objects are in motion prior to contact, the role occupied by each depends on the judgment that is being made. If the force exerted by Object A is being judged, then Object A is treated as the active object and Object B as the object acted on. If the force exerted by Object B is being judged, then Object B is treated as the active object and Object A as the object acted on. When both objects are in motion prior to contact, this brings into play the fourth velocity component, vB before. But the foregoing reasoning still applies. Whichever object is being judged, the main determinants of perceived force exerted by that object should be the speed of that object prior to contact and the speed of the other object after contact. The prior behavior of the object acted on is not involved in the perception of force involved in producing the outcome. Designating the object the force of which is being judged as "O1" and the other object as "O2," the hypothesis is that perceived force is determined by vO1 before and vO2 after. I shall refer to this as the O1B/O2A hypothesis (O1 before, O2 after).
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There is evidence in support of this contention. In a study by diSessa (1982) , participants interacted with a computer-generated object that moved in accordance with Newtonian laws. In the absence of force applied to it, the object moved in a straight line at constant speed. Participants attempted to control the motion of the object by applying simulated pushes to it. diSessa (1982) found that both adults and children almost always expected that the object would move in precisely the direction it was pushed. In fact the resultant direction of motion is a function of the direction of the push and the direction of the object's prior motion: the push deflects the object, rather than fully determining its path. Participants' expectations therefore exhibited neglect of the role played by the object's prior momentum.
What determines perceived resistance? We have seen that an object that does not move in an interaction should be judged as offering substantial resistance to the object acting on it. This would appear to imply that vB after is the main determinant of the amount of resistance offered by Object B: vA before is largely irrelevant. When Object B does move after contact, however, this may not be the case. In perception of typical launching effect stimuli, only visually perceived kinematic information is available. With a force and resistance conceptualization, arguably the available information is ambiguous in what it conveys: For a given combination of velocities, Object B could be offering a lot of resistance to a lot of force, or a little resistance to a little force. In effect, only relative amounts of force and resistance can be judged. This suggests that judgments of resistance should be influenced by the behavior of Object A as well as that of Object B: If the perceived amount of force exerted by Object A is determined mainly by vA before and vB after, then the judged resistance offered by Object B should be determined by the same parameters.
Summary of Predictions and Two Caveats
The main predictions derived in the foregoing account are now listed.
1. In stimuli where Object A is in motion and Object B is stationary prior to contact, where Object B moves after contact, Object A will be judged as exerting more force than Object B. This prediction was formulated and tested by White (2007) and is further tested here.
2. In stimuli where Object A is in motion and Object B is stationary prior to contact, for Object B the judged resistance to Object A will tend to be greater when there is no perceptible outcome for Object B than when there is a perceptible outcome for Object B.
3. In stimuli where Object A is in motion and Object B is stationary prior to contact, where there is a perceptible outcome for Object B, the amount of force exerted by 2 The findings reported by White (2007) do not entirely support the O1B/O2A hypothesis. In a set of stimuli called the moving set, both objects were in motion both before contact (coming together from opposite directions) and after contact (each of them reversing direction at contact). Speeds of both objects both before and after contact were manipulated. The findings showed that judgments of the amount of force exerted by each object on the other were influenced only by the speeds of both objects prior to contact and not significantly by the speed of either object after contact. One possible problem with this study is that the design used the same values of speed for both objects before and after contact. The kinematics of the display would have made it obvious that the objects were moving at the same speed prior to contact in some situations and at different speeds prior to contact in others. Thus, matching and nonmatching speeds would have been a salient feature of the stimulus presentations, and this might have induced participants to base their judgments on a prior judgment of whether the speeds before contact matched or not. The present studies use stimuli in which the objects have different values of speed from each other both before and after contact. It is predicted that the findings obtained by White (2007) will not generalize to this situation and that the O1B/O2A hypothesis will hold.
Object A on Object B will be judged greater than the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A. When there is no perceptible outcome for Object B, the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A will be judged greater than the amount of force exerted by Object A on Object B. In the latter case, the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A will be judged greater than the amount of force exerted by Object B on Object A.
4. The O1B/O2A hypothesis: The perceived force exerted by an active object (O1) is determined mainly by vO1 before and also by vO2 after. vO1 after and vO2 before should have little or no effect. Specifically for the case of launching-type stimuli where Object B is stationary prior to contact, the perceived amount of force exerted by Object A is determined mainly by vA before and vB after, and not by vA after.
5. The perceived resistance offered by Object B to Object A in a launching-type stimulus should be determined mainly by vB after, and vA before may also be influential.
Two caveats may apply. One is that some observers with appropriate education in physics may be mindful of the laws of mechanics in application to the launching-type stimulus. In this case they may acknowledge the possibility that Object B does exert force on Object A. If they recall Newton's third law they may judge equal and opposite forces. This would be a case of explicit level knowledge overriding a normal tendency in perception, effectively intervening between the perception of force and the report of it made on the force rating scale. A second caveat is illustrated by a study such as that by White (2007) and Experiment 2 reported below, where observers are asked to judge the amount of force exerted by Object B on Object A. This question may carry an implicit demand that they should judge Object B to be exerting at least some force on Object A. Also, the very posing of the question may induce observers to think about the interaction in a way that they would not normally do. One possible way of addressing the demand in the question is that they would consider Object B as if it was in the role of Object A; that is, as if B were an active object exerting force on another object. In that case they may make force judgments about Object B in the same way as they make force judgments about Object A, which would mean that their judgments would be influenced mainly by the speed of Object A after contact (not by the speed of Object B prior to contact, because that is always zero in launching-type stimuli).
Overview of Experiments
Three experiments are reported, designed to test the predictions of the models presented above using stimuli based on the launching-type stimulus. Figure 1 presents selected frames from a typical stimulus to depict the general features. The experiments were designed with orthogonal parametric manipulations of kinematic variables and analyzed with analysis of variance (ANOVA). Where post hoc paired comparisons are reported, these were analyzed with the Newman-Keuls test. Orthogonal manipulation of variables in simplified animations avoids the problems posed by the possibility of correlations between variables in naturalistic stimuli (Michaels & De Vries, 1998) . In all experiments participants judged the amount of force exerted by Object A on Object B. Participants also judged either the amount of force exerted by Object B on Object A (Experiments 2 and 3) or the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A (Experiments 1 and 2). Velocities are given positive values when the direction of motion is left to right (the standard direction for launching effect stimuli, as shown in Figure 1 ) and negative values when motion is from right to left.
Details of ANOVA results and post hoc tests are reported in the Appendix. In the following sections, brief descriptions of the results are given. After that, the focus is initially on the five predictions derived from the mechanoreceptor hypothesis, and I describe how the findings relate to those predictions. I then use the findings to test a different class of models based on the idea that kinematic information available in the stimulus serves to specify dynamic properties.
Experiment 1: Judgments of Resistance for Object B
This was designed as a replication of the stationary set in the study by White (2007) , but with a resistance measure instead of a force measure for Object B. The purpose of this was to test Predictions 4 and 5 and the first part of Prediction 3.
Method
Participants. The participants were 29 first-year undergraduate students of psychology at Cardiff University with normal or corrected to normal vision and English as their first language. They received either course credit or payment for their participation. None had been taught any psychology of relevance to this topic.
Apparatus and stimuli. Stimuli consisted of frame sequences generated by a Macintosh G3 computer and displayed on a Mitsubishi Diamond Plus 71 cathode ray tube color monitor. The frames were presented in phase with the computer's vertical blank signal and appeared at the screen refresh rate of 75 Hz. Each frame was 500 pixels (18.5 cm) wide ϫ 300 pixels (11.1 cm) high. The boundaries of the frame appeared on the screen as thin black lines. These disappeared between stimulus presentations, leaving the screen uniform white. All stimuli consisted of 200 frames, 2.7 s in duration. The background of each frame was uniform white throughout. Launching-type stimuli were used, conforming in general features to the type of stimulus depicted in Figure 1 . Object B was stationary until contact in all stimuli. Both objects were discs 1.48 cm in diameter. One was black and one was white, that is, a white disc with a black rim. This manipulation was counterbalanced between Objects A and B. This manipulation had no significant effect in any analysis and is not further discussed.
Rating scales were used for the dependent measures. For Object A, the question was, "How much force did [Object A] exert on [Object B] when they came into contact?" For the resistance measure for Object B the question was, "How strongly did [Object B] resist the force exerted on it by [Object A] when they came into contact?" The terms "Object A" and "Object B" were not used. Instead, brief descriptions of the objects (black circle, white circle) were used, as appropriate. Written instructions informed participants that they should respond to each question by writing a number from 0 to 100. For the force question they were told that 0 meant no force at all and 100 meant maximum possible force. The instructions told them that they could write any number between 0 and 100; the more force they saw the object in question exert on the other object, the higher the number they should put. For the resistance question they were told that 0 meant no resistance at all and 100 meant maximum possible resistance. The instructions told them that they could write any number between 0 and 100; the more strongly they saw the object in question resisting the force exerted on it by the other object, the higher the number they should put.
Design. Three kinematic variables were manipulated within subjects. vA before was manipulated with three values: 8.1 cm/s, 13.5 cm/s, and 18.9 cm/s. 3 vA after was manipulated with three values: -5.4 cm/s, remaining stationary at the point of contact, and 5.4 cm/s. vB after was manipulated with three values: 8.1 cm/s, 13.5 cm/s, and 18.9 cm/s. These manipulations yielded a total of 27 stimuli.
Procedure. The experiment was run by an experimenter blind to the aims and hypotheses. Participants were run individually in a small windowless laboratory, empty except for the equipment used in the experiment and with fluorescent lighting giving a low ambient light level. Participants were seated so that their faces were on a level with the screen and approximately 75 cm from it, and they were allowed to adjust this distance slightly for personal comfort. Participants first filled out an informed consent form. The experimenter then introduced the experiment by telling them that they would see stimuli involving moving objects coming into contact and then described the rating task set for the participant as appropriate to the individual experiment.
The experimenter then told the participants that she would ask if they were ready. This was their cue to fixate on the screen. When they said "yes," the first stimulus was presented. They then made their ratings in the appropriate place on a set of rating scales. This procedure was reiterated until all the stimuli in the experiment had been shown. Order of presentation of the stimuli was randomized independently for each participant. Each stimulus was presented once. At the end of the experiment participants were paid or given course credit, as appropriate, and were given a debriefing sheet explaining the general aims of the research but not revealing the specific hypotheses being tested.
Results
Mean judgments for all stimuli are reported in Table 1 . Judgments of force exerted by Object A were significantly influenced by vA before and vB after, but not by vA after, supporting Prediction 4. Judgments of force tended to increase as vA before increased, and as vB after increased.
Judgments of resistance offered by Object B were affected by all three variables. Judged resistance tended to increase as vB after increased, supporting Prediction 5. Judged resistance also tended to increase as vA before increased, and if Object A reversed direction at contact. Judgments tended to be low, as Table 1 shows, but were highest when Object B moved slowly after contact and when Object A reversed direction after contact.
Comparisons between judgments of Object A and Object B revealed that in all 27 stimuli the mean judged force exerted by Object A was greater than the mean judged resistance offered by Object B, supporting the first part of Prediction 3 (see Table 1 ).
Experiment 2: Force Versus Resistance Judgments
This experiment was designed with a between-subjects comparison between force and resistance measures for Object B. In addition to launching-type stimuli, there were also stimuli in which Object B did not move when Object A contacted it. The purpose of this was to test Predictions 2 and 3. The design also permits further testing of Predictions 1, 4, and 5.
Method
Details of method were as for Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. There were 72 participants, none of whom had participated in Experiment 1. The design involved a comparison between force and resistance measures for judgments of Object B, manipulated as a between-subjects variable. Each participant judged the amount of force exerted by Object A on Object B and either the amount of force exerted by Object B on Object A or the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A. vA before had two values: 10.8 cm/s and 21.6 cm/s. vA after had three values: remaining stationary at the point of contact, Ϫ5.4 cm/s, and Ϫ10.8 cm/s. vB after had four values: remaining stationary, 5.4 cm/s, 10.8 cm/s, and 16.2 cm/s. This yielded a total of 24 stimuli.
Results
Mean judgments for all stimuli are reported in Table 2 . Judgments of force exerted by Object A exhibited several significant interactions with measure. Details of these are presented in the Appendix. The general tendency was for a greater range of means to occur when the force measure was used for Object B than when the resistance measure was used, particularly in relation to the speed of Object B after contact. However the effects of the independent variables on judgments of Object A were similar in significance and direction, regardless of which measure was used for judgments of Object B. Judgments of force exhibited by Object A tended to increase as vA before increased and as vB after increased, as in Experiment 1. There was also a significant effect of vA after: Judgments tended to be higher when Object A reversed direction at 10.8 cm/s than when Object A was stationary after contact. This is discussed in the section on unpredicted findings below.
Judgments of force exerted by Object B were significantly higher when Object B remained stationary after contact than when it moved. They were higher when Object A reversed direction after contact than when it remained stationary. They were also higher at the faster speed of vA before.
Judgments of resistance offered by Object B were high, with a mean of 83.73, when Object B remained stationary after contact, and then declined as vB after increased, supporting Prediction 2. Judgments were higher at the faster value of vA before. They were also higher when Object A reversed direction at the higher of the two speeds after contact than if Object A remained stationary after contact.
Comparisons between judgments of force exerted by Objects A and B for the 18 stimuli in which Object B moved after contact revealed higher judgments for Object A than for Object B in 15 of them, supporting Prediction 1 (see Table 2 , means for force condition). In the remaining three, the difference between the means was less than 2 scale points and not statistically significant.
Comparisons between the force judgment for Object A and the resistance judgment for Object B were also assessed. When Object B remained stationary after contact, judgments of resistance by Object B were higher than judgments of force by Object A in all six comparisons. In 17 of the 18 stimuli where Object B moved after contact, judgments of force by Object A were higher than judgments of resistance by Object B. The one exception was not statistically significant. These results support Prediction 3.
Experiment 3: Prior Motion of Both Objects
In this experiment both objects were in motion prior to contact. They moved horizontally in opposite directions from the left and right edges of the frame, respectively, and came into contact near the middle of the frame. The exact location of contact was determined by their relative speeds prior to contact. At contact Object B reversed direction and Object A either stopped, continued moving to the right, or reversed direction. Participants judged the amount of force exerted by each object on the other. This experiment was designed to test the proposition that the O1B/O2A hypothesis holds for both objects when both objects are in motion prior to contact.
Method
Details of method were as in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. There were 40 participants, none of whom had participated in Experiments 1 or 2. The force measure was used for both Object A and Object B. There were four independent variables manipulated within subjects, the speeds of each object before and after contact. vA before had two values: 10.8 cm/s and 21.6 cm/s. vA after had three values: -8.1 cm/s, remaining stationary at the point of contact, and 8.1 cm/s. vB before had three values: Ϫ5.4 cm/s, Ϫ10.8 cm/s, and Ϫ16.2 cm/s. vB after had three values: 8.1 cm/s, 13.5 cm/s, and 18.9 cm/s. This yielded a total of 54 stimuli.
Results
Mean judgments of force exerted by Object A for all stimuli are reported in Table 3 . Judgments increased as vA before increased and as vB after increased. Judgments were lower when Object A reversed direction after contact than when it remained stationary or continued in the same direction. There was no significant effect of vB before.
Mean judgments of force exerted by Object B for all stimuli are reported in Table 4 . There were only two significant results. Judgments were higher when Object A reversed direction after contact than when Object A remained stationary or continued to move in the same direction. Judgments increased as vB before increased.
Overall, therefore, the results supported Prediction 4, except that there was an unpredicted effect of vA after on judgments of force exerted by Object A. This is discussed in the section on unpredicted findings below. 
Summary of Tests of the Five Predictions
Prediction 1 states that, in stimuli where Object A is in motion and Object B is stationary prior to contact, and where Object B moves after contact, Object A will be judged as exerting more force than Object B. This was tested in Experiment 2 in the condition where the force measure was used for both objects. In that experiment there were 18 stimuli in which Object B moved after contact from Object A, and the mean judgment of force was higher for Object A than for Object B in 15 of them. In the remaining three judgments, the difference between the means was less than 2 scale points and not statistically significant. All three were stimuli in which Object A reversed direction after contacting Object B. A possible explanation for the results with these three stimuli is presented in the section on unpredicted findings.
Prediction 2 states that, in stimuli where Object A is in motion and Object B is stationary prior to contact, for Object B the judged resistance to Object A should tend to be greater when there is no perceptible outcome for Object B than when there is a perceptible outcome. This was tested in Experiment 2, where no motion of Object B after contact was compared with three different speeds of motion after contact. For the six stimuli where Object B remained stationary after contact, mean judged resistance varied from 78.86 Note. Values of independent variables are speeds in cm/s. "B force measure group" and "B resistance measure group" refer to the groups in which the B force and B resistance measures were used, respectively. Judgments of force exerted by Object A were made in both groups. vA and vB ϭ velocities of Objects A and B, respectively. to 89.36. For the 18 stimuli where Object B moved after contact, the highest mean judged resistance was 48.52. Experiment 2 was designed with equal size increments in vB after. The hypothesis implies unequal differences in resistance judgments, with a greater difference between no motion and the slowest speed than between other pairs of speeds. To test this, difference scores were computed for each participant by subtracting the mean for 5.4 cm/s motion from the mean for no motion, the mean for 10.8 cm/s from that for 5.4 cm/s, and that for 16.2 cm/s from that for 10.8 cm/s. The resultant difference scores were analyzed with a one-way ANOVA with repeated measures and a significant result was found, F(2, 82) ϭ 43.60, MSE ϭ 307.92, p Ͻ .001. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed that the difference score for the comparison between no motion and 5.4 cm/s was greater ( p Ͻ .01) than the other two difference scores, which did not differ significantly. This result supports the hypothesis of a categorical distinction in judgment of resistance between no perceptible outcome and some perceptible outcome.
Prediction 3 has two parts. First, in stimuli where Object A is in motion and Object B is stationary prior to contact, and where Object B moves after contact, the amount of force exerted by Object A on Object B will be judged greater than the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A. Experiments 1 and 2 provide relevant data. In Experiment 1 there were 27 means on each measure, and the mean on the A force measure was higher than that on the B resistance measure in all 27 comparisons. In Experiment 2 there were 18 such comparisons, and the mean on the A force measure was higher than that on the B resistance measure in 17 out of the 18. The difference in the one exception was not statistically significant. The findings therefore supported the hypothesis. It may be possible to construct stimuli in which Object B moves after contact and for which the judged resistance offered by Object B would be greater than the judged force exerted by Object A. Most likely this would involve a combination of fast vA before and very slow vB after. However, if there is not too great a disparity between vA before and vB after, the tendency to give higher ratings on the A force measure than on the B resistance measure appears to be quite general.
The second part of the prediction states that, when there is no perceptible outcome for Object B, the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A should be judged greater than the amount of force exerted by Object A on Object B. This prediction is tested by the stimuli in Experiment 2 where Object B did not move after contact. There were six of these. On the A force measure the means ranged from 18.17 to 59.38, and on the B resistance measure they ranged from 78.86 to 89.36, so the distributions are nonoverlapping. The respective overall means were 40.60 and 83.73, and a one-way ANOVA with repeated measures confirmed that this difference was significant, F(1, 41) ϭ 75.25, MSE ϭ 516.03, p Ͻ .001. This supports the prediction.
Prediction 4 states that, in stimuli where Object A is in motion and Object B is stationary prior to contact, and where there is a perceptible outcome for Object B, the main determinants of judged force exerted by Object A will be vA before and vB after; vA after should have little or no effect. In these stimuli Object B is stationary prior to contact, so the effects of vB before cannot be assessed. This O1B/O2A hypothesis was tested with effect size measures for the relevant effects in the ANOVAs on data from Experiments 1 and 2. Effect sizes on judgments of force exerted by Object A for the manipulations of vA before, vB after, and vA after are shown in Table 5 . Table 5 shows consistent and strong effects of vA before in all the experiments, with an overall mean effect size of .59. The effect of vB after is more variable, with an overall mean of effect size of .35. The mean effect size for vA after was .16. These results support the prediction.
Where both objects are in motion prior to contact, the O1B/O2A hypothesis holds for each: For judgments of Object A, there should be significant effects of vA before and vB after, and no significant effects of the other two kinematic variables; and for judgments of Object B, there should be significant effects of vB before and vA after, and no significant effects of the other two kinematic variables. The results of Experiment 3 mostly support these predictions. In judgments of force exerted by Object B, vB before and vA after were the only significant effects, as predicted. In judgments of force exerted by Object A, there were strong effects of vA before and vB after, and no significant effect of vB before, as predicted, but there was also a strong effect of vA after, which was not predicted. What differentiates the two objects in these stimuli is that Object B invariably reverses direction after contact, whereas Object A sometimes reverses direction, sometimes remains stationary, and sometimes continues in the same direction. When Object A continues in the same direction it could be seen as continuing to influence the motion of Object B after contact. This is a visual impression of causality called the entraining effect (Michotte, 1963) . Indeed, in one stimulus the two objects remain in contact after the collision, which is the circumstance under which the impression of entraining is maximal. So in this case force impressions could be modified by the degree to which the additional impression of entraining occurs. Prediction 5 states that the perceived resistance offered by Object B to Object A in a launching-type stimulus should be determined mainly by vB after, and vA before may also be influential. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 supported this prediction inasmuch as there were strong effects of vB after and weaker but significant effects of vA before. There were also significant unpredicted effects of vA after, which are discussed in the section on unpredicted findings.
There were significant effects of all three kinematic variables on judgments of force for Object B. It was argued in the introduction that merely posing a question about the force exerted by Object B induces participants to consider Object B as if it were in the role of an active, self-propelled object. The significant effects of vB before and vA after are consistent with this. The effect of vA before was barely significant, and was not significant in White (2007) , so it is of doubtful reliability. If this argument is correct, then the effects on the force judgment measure should be attenuated if participants rate both force and resistance for Object B. A test of this prediction is planned.
Unpredicted Findings
Several unpredicted findings occurred that were associated with stimuli where Object A reversed direction after contacting Object B. This is a physically unusual event. Runeson (1983) showed that the kinematic features of the typical launching stimulus lie at an extreme of the continuum of possibilities allowed by the laws of mechanics and that in most cases (and in the absence of friction with the surface on which it is moving) Object A would continue to move in the same direction at reduced speed after contact. If Object A is rotating with backspin, reversal of direction could occur through contact with Object B and friction with the surface on which Object A is moving. This kind of effect can be observed in pool, snooker, and billiards. Nonetheless, it is an unusual occurrence and one with which most observers are unlikely to be familiar.
Under the mechanoreceptor hypothesis, a stimulus in which Object A reverses direction after contacting Object B can be matched to a representation of an action on an object in which the object acts back against the actor, displacing the actor's extremity.
No such action on the part of Object B is observed, but the stimulus may still resemble this representation sufficiently well for a match to be made. Essentially, Object B is perceived as acting on Object A, even though Object B is inactive prior to contact. The stimulus could also match representations in which the actor's extremity is voluntarily withdrawn after contact. That interpretation is not likely to be strongly favored because voluntary withdrawal at contact may be more commonly associated with actions involving merely touching another object without moving it. So, to some extent, the stimulus may be perceived in terms of Object B acting on Object A.
This hypothesis generates several predictions that fit with the results. It predicts that stimuli where Object A reverses direction after contacting Object B may be an exception to the general proposition that Object A is seen as exerting more force on Object B than Object B is seen as exerting on Object A. This fits with the finding in Experiment 2 that all three stimuli where Object B was seen as exerting at least as much force as Object A involved Object A reversing direction after contact. It predicts that the O1B/O2A hypothesis should apply to Object B when Object A reverses direction after contact. In that case, there should be an effect of vA after on judgments of force exerted by Object B, and this was found in Experiment 2.
The hypothesis also predicts that there should be an effect of vA after on judgments of force exerted by Object A. Specifically, Object A should be judged to be exerting more force on Object B when Object A reverses direction after contact than when it does not. The reasoning behind this runs as follows. If Object B is judged to be exerting force on Object A, then Object A must be judged as exerting more force on Object B to produce the same outcome for Object B. That is, where the outcome for Object B is the same, Object A must have exerted more force in the condition where Object A reversed direction after contact than in the condition where Object A remained stationary after contact. This is because, in the former case, Object A has to overcome both Object B's resistance and the force exerted by Object B on Object A, whereas in the latter case Object A has to overcome only Object B's resistance. This fits with the results of Experiment 2. There is as yet no evidence that there would be any effect of speed of A after if Object A did not reverse direction after contact.
Finally, the hypothesis could explain the finding that judged resistance offered by Object B was higher when Object A reversed direction after contact than when it did not. If Object B is judged to be administering a positive push to Object A, this would be interpreted as Object B exerting force on Object A. In the resistance condition participants do not have the opportunity to rate the force exerted by Object B. It is therefore possible that their rating of resistance was influenced by their judgment that Object B was doing more than just resisting Object A. If that is the case then there should be no effect of vA after when Object A does not reverse direction after contact. This is consistent with the results of Experiment 1, where there was no significant difference on the resistance measure between stimuli in which Object A remained stationary after contact and stimuli in which Object A continued to move from left to right.
Overall, there was no case where a predicted effect did not occur. The support found for the five predictions therefore gives general support to the mechanoreceptor hypothesis, from which they were derived. There were some unpredicted findings, which have been briefly discussed; most of these involve the unusual stimuli where Object A reverses direction after contact, and it has been argued that these are consistent with the present account if participants tend to judge that Object B must have acted on Object A to make it reverse direction.
Kinematic Specification of Forces
The causal asymmetry shows that people are not judging forces in accordance with Newton's third law (White, 2006 ). An alternative possibility is that they are judging forces from some other dynamic variable or combination of variables. For example, they could be perceiving the momentum of an object and inferring force from that. This possibility is attractive because it makes sense of the tendency to judge that Object B in a launching-type stimulus exerts little or no force on Object A (White, 2007) . Under the equation for momentum, p ϭ mv, an object with a velocity of zero has no momentum. Object B in a launching-type stimulus is stationary prior to contact, so it has no momentum when Object A contacts it, and so this could explain why it is perceived as exerting no force on Object A.
Momentum is a covert property of an object and not directly visually perceived. However, dynamic properties can be derived from observable information about kinematics under some circumstances. Runeson (1983) showed that the mass ratio of the Objects A and B in a collision event can be derived from the kinematic information in accordance with Equation 1.
In this equation u ϭ velocity prior to contact and v ϭ velocity after contact. This is an idealized description because it assumes that no energy is transferred to other forms such as heat energy or sound energy, and it assumes no deformation of the objects at contact. Motions of real objects are also usually affected by friction, air resistance, and gravity. These assumptions are, however, consistent with the observable features of launching-type stimuli; moreover they do not invalidate ordinal comparisons between judgments of different stimuli. There is evidence that, with training involving feedback, observers can learn to make accurate judgments of relative mass (Runeson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2000; Runeson & Vedeler, 1993) , though it is not clear that they are doing so by picking up the kinematic specifications of dynamical information, nor that the level of accuracy is always high (A. L. Cohen, 2006) .
If the mass ratio can be derived from kinematic information, then the relative momenta of the objects can also be derived in accordance with Equation 2:
In this equation p ϭ momentum, v ϭ any of the four velocities in Equation 1, and m is the relative mass derived by application of Equation 1. To compare judgments of momentum across stimuli it is necessary to assume that the sum of the masses of the objects is the same in every stimulus. Since the absolute masses of the objects cannot be ascertained, this is not an unreasonable assumption because the mass ratios obviously sum to 1 in each stimulus. Under one dynamic model, then, object momenta are derived from kinematic information and form the basis for judging the amount of force each object exerts on the other. The judged amount of force would equal the judged momentum of the object in question prior to contact. It is also possible that the judged amount of force would depend to some extent on the momentum of the other object after contact. That is, judged force might be based on some notion of transfer of momentum. One way of estimating the transfer of momentum would be just to add the momentum prior to contact of the object being judged to the momentum after contact of the other object. One reason for testing such a model is that it focuses on the two variables that are deemed to be most important under the O1B/O2A hypothesis, vO1 before and vO2 after. It differs from the mechanoreceptor hypothesis in deriving judgments from the selected dynamic properties that can be inferred from kinematic information, so it is a plausible competitor to the mechanoreceptor hypothesis that retains the general principle of deriving dynamic properties from kinematic cues. This model does not correspond to any meaningful physical quantity. It is proposed as a test of the possibility that people are making some kind of inference from ascertainable dynamical properties of the stimuli, not that they are necessarily doing so in a way that is objectively correct.
It is difficult to envisage any other plausible model of force judgments based on derived dynamic properties. The impulse, or force acting on a mass through contact, is given by Equation 3:
In this equation, which is a version of Newton's second law, f ϭ ma, F stands for force (measured in Newtons) and v and u refer to the velocities after and before contact of the object on which the force acts. It might seem that this is a logical candidate for a model of judged force, since it uses velocity and time information that can be observed in the stimulus. But the relation described by this equation is symmetrical in accordance with Newton's third law and so it always predicts that both objects should be judged as exerting equal and opposite forces on each other, a prediction that has already been disconfirmed (White, 2007) .
The two dynamic models described above were used to generate predictions for each of three judgments: judged force exerted by Object A on Object B, judged force exerted by Object B on Object A, and judged resistance offered by Object B to Object A. In brief, the models failed to predict the present results. They tended to predict main effects of all four kinematic variables (speeds of Objects A and B before and after contact) and large numbers of interactions between the independent variables. This is a consequence of the fact that all four velocity components are included in the derivation of relative force. To illustrate, let me take the model based on the perceived momentum for Object A before contact, as a predictor of judged force exerted by Object A. This model predicts effects of all four kinematic variables (when manipulated). This is discrepant with the results. In Experiment 3 there was no significant effect of vB before, and across all the experiments effects of vA after were either weaker than those of vA before and vB after or nonsignificant. In particular, the model predicts effects of vA before and vA after that are of similar size, and this was not found in any of the experiments. Across the three experiments, the model predicts eight two-way interactions. Of these, only two were statistically significant and one of those exhibited a pattern different from that predicted.
The models discussed so far assume that information about relative mass is derived from the kinematic information and used to infer momentum and that force perception is influenced by this. An alternative possibility is that information about relative mass is not influential in force perception. In effect, judges could operate under the assumption that both objects (all objects across a range of stimuli) have the same mass. 4 In that case, Equation 2 reduces to p ϭ v, and force perception is governed entirely by velocity information. Then it would just be a case of deciding which velocities to include and how to relate them to each other.
For judgments of force exerted by Object A, the closest match to the observed results comes with a model in which v is the sum of vA before and vB after. This model predicts equal size main effects of vA before and vB after, no effect of vA after and vB before, and no interactions. This yields a reasonable approximation to the results. It does not account for the finding that vA before carries more weight than vB after, nor the significant effect of vA after in Experiment 2. However it is consistent with the significant main effects of vA before and vB after, and more importantly it is consistent with the general absence of significant interactions.
However it is not clear that models of this kind are viable. There are four velocity components, so it is necessary to ask which of these ought to be included in the computation. Including all four velocities, which would appear to be necessary for the correct computation of forces (or the closest possible approximation to it) is clearly not correct, because this would predict significant effects of all four velocities on force judgment, which was not found. If the objects are assumed to have the same mass, the momentum possessed by Object A prior to contact is given by vA before. That is, variations in vA before between stimuli are isomorphic to variations in momentum of Object A between stimuli. In that case, it could be argued that the amount of force exerted by Object A on Object B equals the momentum possessed by Object A prior to contact. Force judgment based on that principle would therefore be influenced only by vA before, and the results of the experiments show that that was not the case.
The models being discussed here assume equal masses for the objects. But with a launching-type stimulus that assumption is refuted by the kinematic information in any stimulus where vA before is not equal to vB after. This arises from the fact that the total momentum of the two bodies is conserved. In a launchingtype stimulus, prior to the collision Object B is stationary, and therefore has zero momentum. After the collision Object A is stationary, and therefore has zero momentum. It follows that the momentum possessed by Object A prior to the collision must be equal to that possessed by Object B after the collision. But if both objects have the same mass, the principle of conservation of momentum requires vB after to be the same as vA before. This argument ignores the fact that a certain amount of momentum is lost through transfer to heat and sound energy at the collision. Perception might be guided by some kind of assumption about the amount of energy that is lost in this way. But if no such assumption is made, or if the same assumption is made for all stimuli, then any variation in vB after that is not correlated with variations in vA before would suffice to refute the assumption that the objects have the same mass. If perceptual processing really, and incorrectly, treats the objects as if they had the same mass for purposes of inferring forces, this seems to refute the very principle on which the kinematic specification of dynamics is based.
A second problem is that the models do not explain how a distinction between force and resistance could arise. The concept of resistance does not correspond to any dynamic property or to any subcategory of forces. There are just forces (and other relevant properties such as mass). The models might be able to account for observed tendencies in judgments of force and resistance but do not explain why some interactions are interpreted in terms of force and resistance instead of opposing forces. In fact, the models do not explain why force perception does not conform to Newton's third law. It is precisely these things that the mechanoreceptor hypothesis does explain.
A third problem is that the models do not explain how the effects of vA after could vary. It was shown above that stimuli in which Object A reverses direction after contact appear to be a special case. For example, vA after has no significant effect on judgments of force exerted by Object A except when Object A reverses direction after contact; judgments of force exerted by Object A tend to be higher in stimuli of that sort. It is possible to construct a dynamic model in which judgments are based on vA before, vB after, and vA after. The problem is to explain why that model holds under some circumstances and not under others. There should be a principled means of deciding which model should apply under any given circumstance, and that is lacking from the account at present.
General Discussion
Impressions of force are a ubiquitous feature of perceptions of objects interacting. It is possible to predict some tendencies in force perception on the basis of the hypothesis that the understanding of forces is derived from experiences of actions on objects mediated by the mechanoreceptor system. In particular, it was argued that experiences of actions on objects give rise to a basic dichotomy of force and resistance, with the actions of selfpropelled objects forming the basis for the concept of force and the behavior of non-self-propelled objects forming the basis for the concept of resistance. The results of three experiments supported predictions derived from this account. Some additional unpredicted findings occurred and possible explanations were proposed for these; further research would be required to test those. Alternative models based on the possibility that kinematic variables might serve to specify forces cannot be completely ruled out if equal mass of the objects is assumed in them, but they suffer from some presently unresolved problems.
A striking feature of the dynamic models is that they predict many interactions between kinematic variables, whereas in fact few interactions were statistically significant. This suggests that judged force can be modeled to a reasonable approximation as an additive combination of the relevant kinematic variables. The general form of a weighted additive model for kinematic variables is shown in Equation 4:
In this equation w 1 . . . w 4 are weights specific to the respective velocities, JO is the judged object, and OO is the other object. The velocities are perceived velocities, which may or may not be isomorphic with objective velocities (J. F. Brown, 1931; Raymond, 1988) . According to the mechanoreceptor hypothesis, u JO should carry more weight than v OO , and the other two velocities should carry negligible weight. The mean weights found in the present experiments were w 1 ϭ .59 and w 4 ϭ .35, and in both cases force judgments tended to increase with increasing speed, so the specific form of the mechanoreceptor hypothesis could be modeled by Equation 5:
The weights in Equation 5 are approximate and subject to fluctuation depending on conditions such as object salience and the absolute range of velocities in the stimuli, but they should be close to the average weights for a representative sample of stimuli. The main exception revealed by the results concerns the significant effects of vA after on judgments of Object A found when Object A reversed direction after contact in some stimuli. As discussed above, this is a physically anomalous occurrence, and it remains to be shown whether the weight of vA after would be greater than zero for a range of stimuli in which Object A did not reverse direction after contact. For Object B in a launching effect stimulus u JO ϭ v OO ϭ 0 cm/s, so Equation 5 predicts that Object B will be judged as exerting no force on Object A. This is consistent with the results (White, 2007) . However, if Object A reverses direction after contacting Object B, judgments of force exerted by Object B are significantly higher (see White, 2007 , and the present research). This is not predicted by Equation 5 because v JO , which is vA after when the force exerted by Object B is being judged, has zero weight. Possible explanations for this have already been discussed and require further testing.
Judgments of the amount of resistance offered by Object B to Object A were predominantly determined by vB after, with lower judgments of resistance being made as speed increased. There were also significant, though variable, effects of vA before and vA after. The main finding about resistance is that the resistance offered by Object B was judged to be greater than the force exerted by Object A when Object B did not move after contact, but consistently less when Object B did move after contact. This fits with the hypothesis that the interaction is understood as a relation between the force exerted by one object and the resistance offered by the other; when resistance is greater than force there is no outcome for the effect object, and when force is greater than resistance there is some kind of outcome. When both objects are in motion prior to contact, it is possible that this relation is seen as working both ways; that is, Object B offers resistance (or not) to Object A and Object A offers resistance to Object B. In this research no measure was taken of the judged resistance offered by Object A.
Alternative Hypotheses
A possible alternative to the mechanoreceptor hypothesis draws on visual salience. Moving objects tend to be more salient than stationary ones. Given this, in a launching-type stimulus, Object A is more salient than Object B prior to contact and Object B is more salient than Object A after contact. Causality tends to be attributed more to things that are high in salience than to things that are low in salience (Taylor & Fiske, 1975) , so the salience hypothesis would predict that vA before and vB after would be stronger determinants of perceived force than vA after and vB before. The findings on judgments of force exerted by Object A for stimuli in which Object B is stationary prior to contact and Object A is stationary after contact are consistent with this reasoning (Experiments 1 and 2).
There are several problems with this hypothesis, however. Salience is the same regardless of what judgment is being made, so the hypothesis would predict that vA before and vB after would be the strongest determinants of judgments of force exerted by Object B as well as by Object A. The results of White (2007) show that this is not the case. Force ratings for Object B were not significantly influenced by either vA before or vB after. When both objects are in motion both before and after contact (Experiment 3), all four motion components would be equally salient and so the salience hypothesis would predict equal weighting for all four. In fact this was not the case. For Object A, vA before and vB after were the most influential factors, as they were in stimuli where Object B was stationary before contact and Object A was stationary after contact. The change in motion properties, with consequent change in visual salience, had no discernible effect on ratings of Object A. For Object B, vB before and vA after were the strongest influences on force ratings, the opposite of what was the case for Object A. Since this difference occurred within the same set of stimuli, it cannot be accounted for by considerations of visual salience. The salience hypothesis therefore fails to account for some of the major tendencies in the findings.
Another alternative hypothesis accepts that experiences of actions on objects are the source of information used for force judgments, but proposes that such judgments might be determined by perceptual information derived from typical visual fixation points during execution of an action on an object. That is, the motion components that carry the most weight in force judgments are those that are most fixated during observation of the stimulus. Studies have been carried out in which eye movements and fixations are monitored during the execution of simple motor tasks such as lifting a bar and using it to depress a switch (Ballard, Hayhoe, Li, & Whitehead, 1992; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Johansson, Westling, Bäckström, & Flanagan, 2001; Land, 2006; Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999) . If the motion components that dominate force judgments are determined by the fixation points that occur during the execution of actions on objects, then the present results would lead one to expect that the eye should be fixated on the hand (or other part of the body) as it approaches the object in question and fixated on the object after contact. In fact the studies have consistently found that the eyes do not track these movements; instead they fixate the goals of the movement components. Thus, when the hand is approaching the object, gaze is fixated on the object; and, when the object has been contacted, fixation shifts abruptly to the place to which the object is to be moved (Johansson et al., 2001) . It can be concluded that force judgments are not determined by information obtained from fixation patterns modeled on those used during actions on objects.
It is not known whether the same pattern of fixation occurs in observation of launching-type stimuli. Flanagan and Johansson (2003) found that virtually the same pattern of fixation occurred for actors grasping and manipulating objects and for observers of those actions; observers too were fixating goal points rather than the motions of hand or object toward those goal points. Flanagan and Johansson concluded that, "during action observation humans implement, instinctively, motor programs equivalent to those used in action" (p. 770). This equivalence is directly relevant to the system that maps observed actions onto motor representations of those actions, which is involved in inferring the goals and intentions of other actors. The objects in launching-type stimuli have no goals or intentions, so the mapping of the actor's movements to the observer's motor programs is not required. It could still be hypothesized, therefore, that the weights of the motion components in determining force judgments are set by fixation patterns during observation of the stimuli. This hypothesis would be supported by evidence that the eyes fixated Object A and tracked its motion prior to contact and fixated Object B and tracked its motion after contact.
However this hypothesis has a problem with stimuli in which both objects are in motion both before and after contact (Experiment 3). The problem is that different motion components determined force judgments for the two objects. For Object A, vA before and vB after were the main determinants, but for Object B, vB before and vA after were the main determinants. If the participant is fixating Object A prior to contact and Object B after contact, and force judgments for Object A are determined mainly by that fixation pattern, they cannot simultaneously be fixating Object B prior to contact and Object A after contact; but this is what the hypothesis requires in order to account for judgments of force exerted by Object B. Fixation could shift back and forth between the different motion components, as happens when actors are simultaneously engaged in two actions (Land et al., 1999) . But, whatever the fixation pattern may be, the hypothesis is compelled to predict that the weights of the motion components should be the same for judgment of Object B as they are for Object A because there can be only one fixation pattern for a single presentation of any given stimulus. Therefore fixation patterns cannot account for the within-stimulus differences in weights of motion components between judgments of Object A and judgments of Object B.
Methodological Considerations
These experiments used stimuli modeled on those that have been used in studies of phenomenal causality (Michotte, 1963; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; White & Milne, 1999) . Such stimuli are highly abstracted. The objects are simple two-dimensional geometrical shapes moving in an undefined and undifferentiated space. There are no clues to object identity or size, to surfaces on which they may be moving, or to point of view. This was partly for the purpose of investigating parallels between force impressions and causal impressions such as the launching effect, which required similar kinds of stimuli to be used. An additional aim was to elucidate the basics of force impressions, as far as possible uncontaminated by acquired knowledge about particular kinds of objects and environments. The fact that consistent tendencies emerged in this research shows that the abstract nature of the stimuli does not render them meaningless or confusing.
Under the present account, perception of interactions between objects is based on a particular kind of experience with real interactions in which the actor plays a part. Obviously such experiences cannot violate the laws of physics, so there is a need to consider whether the orthogonal manipulations of kinematic variables in this research resulted in stimuli that violate the laws of physics, which would render them problematic for hypothesistesting purposes. Momentum is conserved, so on that basis it could be argued that any collision in which the sum of the velocities is greater after the collision than before is physically impossible. But this ignores two factors. One is spin. As I have already argued, and as can be seen in games such as pool, spherical objects can reverse direction after contact if they have backspin, so stimuli in the present research in which Object A reverses direction after contacting Object B do not depict impossible occurrences. The other is internal sources of energy. Michotte (1963) reported that if Object B's speed after contact was greater than Object A's speed prior to contact, observers tended to say they had an impression of triggering, as if contact from A released some kind of energy source in B that sent it off at higher velocity. So, while some stimuli may be more unusual than others, none violates the laws of physics.
Any response given in an experiment on either phenomenal causality or force impressions could plausibly reflect some kind of deliberation and the use of acquired knowledge (Gemelli & Cappellini, 1958) . Experience and education both influence the explicit understanding of force that participants may have (Ioannides & Vosniadou, 2002) , and it is possible that some responses in the present experiments were influenced by this. In fact one participant in Experiment 2 (force condition) made identical judgments of force for Objects A and B throughout, and it is likely that this reflects use of acquired knowledge of Newton's third law, rather than actual perception. However it is not likely that explicit acquired knowledge will influence the actual perception of force. Reasonable precautions such as suitable instructions to participants should be sufficient to minimize the effects of acquired knowledge on reported impressions of force and resistance, as in research on phenomenal causality.
Does the Haptic System Yield Information Just About Contingencies, Not About Forces?
It has been claimed that the fundamental data for causal learning are data about contingencies, empirical regularities that serve to mark causal relations (e.g., Cheng, 1993 Cheng, , 1997 . Under that argument, it could be claimed that what is detected through actions on objects is contingencies, and that it is therefore contingency detection that grounds knowledge of interactions between objects, not force perception. It is certainly the case that there are reliable contingencies in actions on objects: The actor acts and motion of or change in the object acted on occurs reliably immediately upon the actor's action. But there is more than one refutation of the claim that contingency detection is the basis of knowledge of interactions.
A small number of individuals have unfortunately lost their mechanoreceptor systems as adults, from the neck level down, through neuropathy (Cole & Sedgwick, 1992; Gallagher & Cole, 1995; Rothwell et al., 1982) . From the present point of view this provides a critical test because information about forces obtained through the mechanoreceptor system has been lost in these patients but the ability to detect contingencies between actions and outcomes through the visual modality is preserved. If contingency detection was the source of whatever causal knowledge is gained through interacting with objects, these patients would still be able to interact effectively with objects and have a clear understanding of the causal relations involved in such interactions. Instead, clinical and anecdotal descriptions of the patients' attempts to manipulate objects demonstrate severe and lasting handicap. Initially, the patients were almost unable to move and were confined to bed in an extremely disabled condition. Years of extensive and determined effort in rehabilitation resulted in varying degrees of improvement, but all the patients continued to experience great difficulties in interacting with objects.
The use of the visual modality in the control of movement shows that the ability to detect contingencies between actions and the motions of objects acted on is intact. Patients are able to detect their own movements, contact with the object, and movement of the object contingent on their action, all through the visual modality. But the detected contingency is of almost no help to them, as quotations from Rothwell et al. (1982) reveal: "He explained that the postures he adopted when manipulating objects were caused by his inability to judge accurately the amount of force to exert" (p. 525). In addition, visual information was insufficient for him to be able to correct any errors that were developing in the output since, after a period, he had no indication of the pressure that he was exerting on an object; all he saw was either the pen or the cup slipping from his grasp. (p. 539) Cole and Sedgwick (1992) reported that, after much practice, their patient had become able to hold an egg so long as he was seated and fully concentrated on the task. But if he was asked to walk at the same time, or if his visual attention wandered from the egg, he immediately broke it because he had no idea of the force he was exerting on it. Many other descriptions convey the same message. Effective manipulation of objects depends on the ability to perceive forces in interactions between one's own body and the object in question. It is the functioning mechanoreceptor system, and the perception and experience of forces that it gives us, that is critical for an understanding of interactions between objects, not the mere detection of contingencies.
The second refutation is that it is hard to see how contingency detection could account for experiences of differing degrees of force and resistance. Suppose I pick up a bottle of water with my hand. If my knowledge that I am acting on the bottle of water comes from the contingency I detect between the motion of my arm and hand and the motion of the bottle, how can I have the impression of exerting a given amount of force on the bottle, or of the bottle as offering a given amount of resistance through its inertial mass? There can be little doubt that we do have such impressions. It is clear to anyone who tries that an empty bottle offers less resistance than a full one and, for that matter, that pushing a car requires more exertion of force than pushing a bicycle does. Even if contingency information plays a role in the acquisition of causal understanding, it cannot account for these experiences (see also Wolff, 2007) . Even if I learn how to hold an egg without breaking it by recording contingencies between amounts of force exerted and the outcome for the egg, this learning must be fundamentally dependent on knowledge of amount of force exerted on any given occasion, otherwise I would be in the same position as a deafferented patient.
The third refutation is the one provided by causal asymmetry (White, 2006) . In the launching-type stimulus there are two equal contingencies: contingency between Object A contacting Object B and Object B starting to move, and contingency between Object A contacting Object B and Object A stopping. If the understanding of interactions was founded on contingency detection, both contingencies would be detected and perceived. But only the former is perceived. No model based on contingency detection can explain why one contingency is detected and the other is not.
Relation to Phenomenal Causality
The stimuli used in the present experiments were modeled on those used in studies of phenomenal causality, specifically the launching effect (Michotte, 1963) . Observers of typical stimuli for various effects in phenomenal causality research tend to report a qualitative causal impression, the nature of which differs between the stimuli. For launching effect stimuli the impression is that Object A kicks or shoves or launches Object B. Other qualitatively distinct impressions have also been reported, including pushing or carrying, pulling, enforced disintegration, and penetration (Michotte, 1963; White & Milne, 1997 .
The causal impression and the impression of force exerted could be viewed as qualitative and quantitative aspects of a unitary impression of interaction. The causal impression specifies the qualitative characteristics of the impression, distinguishing launching from entraining or pulling or penetration, for example. The force impression specifies the degree of effort or exertion expended in producing the outcome, so that one can have an impression of launching or pulling or penetration with a certain amount of force. If the impression really is unitary then it is likely that its different qualitative and quantitative aspects would have a common basis in experience. Just as the impression of force is based on experiences of exerting force in actions on objects mediated by the mechanoreceptor system, so the impression of qualitative causality would be based on experiences of performing different kinds of actions on objects and matching kinematic information about interactions between objects to motor representations of specific kinds of actions. Arguably we know from experience that pushing something feels different from pulling it and has different outcomes for the object acted on.
Some authors have argued that the launching effect is mediated by an innate perceptual structure or module that is activated by suitable stimuli (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) . There is evidence of developmental tendencies in visual causal impressions that might seem to count against the innate module hypothesis (L. B. Cohen, Amsel, Redford, & Casasola, 1998; L. B. Cohen & Oakes, 1993; Oakes, 1994; Oakes & Cohen, 1990; Saxe & Carey, 2006) . However, Newman, Choi, Wynn, and Scholl (2008) argued that such evidence does not disconfirm the innate module hypothesis. One of their arguments is that an innate module provides a starting point for development in understanding of concepts that would otherwise be difficult to acquire. From this perspective, evidence of development could be seen as evidence for the module doing its job, and aiding acquisition of understanding. The module itself does not develop, but causal perception extrinsic to the module's operations does develop, aided by the operation of the module.
This makes it unlikely that developmental evidence could be used to decide whether visual causal impressions are mediated by innate modules or not. However there is positive evidence that some causal learning proceeds independently of the launching effect. Kotovsky and Baillargeon (1998) found that infants aged 7 months were surprised when a small causal object made a given effect object move further than a medium sized object had done, but not when a large causal object did so. This indicates that young infants already have expectations about the amount of result that should occur for given relative sizes of causal objects. This is problematic for the innate module hypothesis because the hypothetical module for the launching effect is supposed to be activated by kinematic features, not by object properties. It is, on the other hand, easy to explain in the actions on objects hypothesis. By 7 months, infants are likely to have had sufficient experience with attempts to move objects of different sizes that they understand something of the relation between size and force. The outcome of the test trial with the small causal object captures their attention because it violates an expectation established by the previous trials with the medium sized object, an expectation rooted in the infants' haptic experience of acting on objects. The results therefore favor the possibility that some knowledge of force and its relation to object size or mass has been acquired by the age of 7 months. Further research relating force perception to causal impressions in infancy could shed much light on how the two are related.
Relation to Causal Judgment From Contingency Information
The dominant theme in recent research on causal judgment has been that causal judgment is mainly driven by the detection of contingencies. This approach is rooted in the skeptical philosophy of Hume (1739 Hume ( /1978 ) that causal relations cannot be perceived, and that they can be identified only through the detection of empirical indicators. There has been much research on how causal judgments are made from contingency information (Allan, 1993; Cheng, 1997; Hattori & Oaksford, 2007; Perales & Shanks, 2007; Shanks, 1995; White, 2003) , and most of this has been motivated by the contention that detection of empirical relations is the primary and fundamental means of learning about causal relations. This literature has been further extended by research testing the possibility that a kind of normative causal analysis called Bayesian causal graphs might form the basis of a descriptive account of human causal judgment (Cheng, 1997; Glymour, 2001; Glymour & Cooper, 1999; Gopnik et al., 2004; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; McKenzie & Mikkelson, 2007; Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 2000; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003) . The idea is that Bayesian models could describe a way in which normatively appropriate causal learning can occur, given minimal assumptions about the amount of causal understanding that is present from birth. This has reinvigorated the study of causal judgment by lending greater credence to the hypothesis that contingency is the fundamental kind of information for learning about causality.
I have already argued that acquisition of understanding of causality is based on the perception of forces involved in actions on objects through the mechanoreceptor system and that contingency detection cannot account for this. The present research reveals two further problems for any model of human causal judgment founded on the proposition that contingency information is fundamental to human causal learning and judgment.
First, I have argued that the perception of interactions between objects can be understood as a kind of contest between the force exerted by an active object and the resistance put up by an inactive object. As the experiments have shown, resistance is judged to be greater than force if the inactive object does not move when struck and as less if the inactive object does move. Models of contingency judgment have neglected the role played by resistance in the understanding of causal relations. Both experimental research and theoretical treatments have focused exclusively on the strength of the cause or the likelihood with which the cause produces its effect, as if causes operated in a vacuum.
There is evidence that an understanding of interactions in terms of force and resistance occurs in other domains, including naive physics (Andersson, 1986; D. E. Brown & Clement, 1989; Clement, 1982; diSessa, 1982 diSessa, , 1983 diSessa, , 1993 Minstrell, 1982) , semantics (Talmy, 1988; Wolff, 2007; Wolff & Song, 2003) , and naive ecology (White, 2000) . This evidence covers the whole gamut from perceptual impressions through implicit inferences to explicit reasoning. It is therefore likely that all causal relations, including those that are often used in stimulus materials in contingency judgment experiments, are conceptualized in terms of forceresistance relations. To the extent that resistance is understood as a stable property of an object, it is not impossible that contingency information could be used to infer the amount of resistance possessed by different objects. No such attempt has been made. Existing models implicitly treat the issue of resistance as if it did not exist (see Cheng, 1997; Luhmann & Ahn, 2005; White, 2005) . Failure to include the concept of resistance in theories and models of causal judgment from contingency information would appear to be a significant omission.
The second problem concerns the assumption of unidirectionality. Unidirectionality is the idea that influence in a causal relation flows one way, from cause object to effect object, and not the other way. Unidirectionality is an explicit feature of normative Bayesian models (Pearl, 2000) and an implicit assumption in the study of causal judgment from contingency information (White, 2006) . Considered from the point of view of the laws of mechanics, there are no unidirectional causal relations. If the causal relation is understood as a unidirectional relation, then the category of causality is a spurious category, a creation of human perception and cognition that has no counterpart in nature.
In terms of perceived interactions between objects, both objects exert forces on each other, whether one of them is stationary at contact or not. The evidence of the present research is that people perceive both objects as exerting forces on each other when both are in motion prior to contact, and even when one object is stationary prior to contact if the other object reverses direction. The only circumstance under which one object is not perceived as exerting force on another is that of a launching-type stimulus where Object A does not reverse direction after contact, in which case Object B is not perceived as exerting force on Object A.
It would appear, then, that what people understand as causal relations are those interactions where they (incorrectly) perceive one object as exerting no force on the other. This is the hypothetical unidirectional relation: Force is perceived as exerted in one direction and not in the other. The primary task for theorists is not to explain how people make causal judgments but to explain how causal relations are identified as a distinct class of interactions, given that the class is a spurious one. Proponents of contingencybased models appear to have assumed that the category is real and does not need explanation. This is doubly wrong. It is wrong because there are no unidirectional causal relations in nature, and it is wrong because the distinction between launching (and entrain-ing) and other kinds of interactions between objects is a psychological distinction and not objectively valid.
The launching effect seems to fit well with our intuitive understanding of what a causal relation is. As we perceive it, it is a relation between an active object and an inactive object in which causal influence operates in one direction only, from active object to inactive object. This perception is not true to what the laws of physics tell us is going on. In terms of forces, the launching effect is not different in kind from numerous other interactions that either do not fit our intuitive notion of causality quite so well or do not seem to involve causality at all.
Consider a bottle falling onto a rock and shattering. This might be identified as a causal relation, but it does not seem as straightforward as the launching effect. The bottle is active (in motion) and the rock is inactive, but the (observable) outcome occurs in the bottle, not in the rock. Several things could be identified as the cause of the bottle smashing: the hardness of the rock, the fragility of the bottle, the dropping of the bottle, contact between bottle and rock, or some combination of these. Probably most people would say that causality is involved, but the causal analysis of the event is not so clear, and it does not seem to fit our idea of a causal relation as well as the launching effect does. Consider a plate resting on a table. No forces are perceived when we observe this (Clement, 1987; diSessa, 1993; Gutierrez & Ogborn, 1992) ; nothing seems to be going on. It does not fit our idea of a causal relation at all. Yet the launching effect, the bottle shattering on the rock, and the plate resting on the table all belong in the same category in terms of the laws of physics: different objects exerting forces on each other. If we understand them as categorically different, the categorical differences are psychological in nature, not physical.
I propose that the extent to which we perceive or understand an interaction as a causal relation depends on the extent to which it resembles our experience of an action on an object. Our experience is of action involving the exertion of force to produce an outcome in an inactive but resisting entity. This determines how we perceive launching-type stimuli because such stimuli have kinematic features that match those of an action on an object. That is why they seem like the best exemplar of a causal relation. The bottle shattering on the rock fits less well because it appears as though the bottle is active and exerting force but it is the bottle and not the rock in which the outcome occurs. The plate resting on the table does not fit at all because neither object is active and no forces are perceived.
There is a need to do more than just recognize that causal relations are a psychological category that is not a valid representation of events in nature. There is a need for models of perception, inference, and understanding of the whole range of interactions between objects, from launching-type stimuli to collisions between moving billiard balls to bottles dropping onto rocks and smashing. Contingency-based models of causal judgment have not begun to address this problem because they start from a faulty premise about the nature of causal judgment.
Conclusions
In White (2006) I argued that assignment of the roles of cause and effect, and in consequence the causal asymmetry, was governed by two main criteria, level of activity and practical concerns.
Here I seem to be saying something different, that the causal asymmetry (and other phenomena) is governed by force perception. Let me try to clarify the situation.
Reference to the assignment of causal roles in White (2006) was a clumsy way of talking about what goes on in the schemamatching activity. Matching of kinematic information about a launching-type stimulus to a stored representation of an action on an object results in perception of Object A as active and Object B as inactive. This representation specifies, in part, that the active object exerts force on the inactive object, and the inactive object may offer some degree of resistance to that force but is not perceived as exerting force on the active object. The causal asymmetry therefore results from a sequence of events in perceptual processing, driven by the kinematic features of the stimulus. This understanding of interactions between objects can also be applied in higher cognition, where practical concerns may also influence causal analysis to the extent that the fundamental understanding of causality allows different interpretations of an interaction.
I have already referred to evidence that a conceptualization of interactions between entities in terms of forces acting against resistances can be found in several domains and at levels ranging from perceptual processing to explicit reasoning. This supports the contention that the mechanoreceptor hypothesis describes a possible point of origin for a specific kind of understanding of interactions between entities that is a general feature of causal cognition. I do not doubt that the detection of empirical regularities is an important component of causal learning, but the arguments presented in this article imply that it is not fundamental. I think it more likely that the haptically mediated experience of forces in acting on objects provides the foundation of an understanding of causality and that subsequent causal learning, by whatever means, develops on that foundation.
Many authors have remarked on the agentic character that physical causes seem to possess (diSessa, 1993; Michotte, 1963; Talmy, 1988; Wolff & Song, 2003) . The proposed origin of the perception of forces in experiences of actions on objects provides a simple explanation for this: Physical causes are understood as being like actions on objects, for instance as involving forces acting against resistances, only minus the mental states that are thought to be involved in the generation of actions by humans. People interpret events in which active objects produce outcomes in inactive objects by assimilating them to motor representations based on experiences of acting on non-self-propelled objects. Thus, causality is a psychological construct that is distinguished by its agentic character. The main effect of vA after was not significant (F Ͻ 1). However there was a significant interaction between vA before and vA after, F(4, 112) ϭ 2.77, MSE ϭ 129.74, p Ͻ .05. Simple effects analysis showed significant effects of vA before in conformity with the trend of the main effect at all values of vA after, and there was no significant effect of vA after at any value of vA before. It seems likely, therefore, that this is not a meaningful result. There were no other significant results.
Appendix

ANOVA Results for the Three Experiments
Experiment 1: Judgments of Resistance Offered by Object B
There was a significant effect of vA before, F(2, 56) ϭ 8.70, MSE ϭ 306.35, p Ͻ .001. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed a lower mean at 8.1 cm/s (17.85) than at 13.5 cm/s (23.06) and 18.9 cm/s (23.65), which did not differ significantly. There was a significant effect of vA after, F(2, 56) ϭ 9.90, MSE ϭ 1,277.69, p Ͻ .001. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed a higher mean at Ϫ5.4 cm/s (29.54) than at stationary (18.06) and 5.4 cm/s (16.96), which did not differ significantly. There was a significant effect of vB after, F(2, 56) ϭ 33.22, MSE ϭ 596.13, p Ͻ .001. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed the order 8.1 cm/s (30.47) Ͼ 13.5 cm/s (21.01) Ͼ 8.1 cm/s (13.08).
Experiment 2: Judgments of Force Exerted by Object A
There was a significant interaction between measure and vA before, F(1, 70) ϭ 17.22, MSE ϭ 907.50, p Ͻ .001. Simple effects analysis revealed a significant difference between the force and resistance conditions at vA before ϭ 21.6 cm/s, F(1, 70) ϭ 13.15, MSE ϭ 1,819.29, p Ͻ .001, with a higher mean in the resistance condition (60.03) than in the force condition (49.36). There was no significant difference at vA before ϭ 10.8 cm/s (F Ͻ 1).
There was a significant interaction between measure and vA after, F(2, 140) ϭ 6.74, MSE ϭ 355.61, p Ͻ .01. Simple effects analysis revealed a significant difference between the force and resistance conditions at vA after ϭ -10.8 cm/s, F(1, 70) ϭ 10.67, MSE ϭ 1,049.81, p Ͻ .01, with a higher mean in the resistance condition (55.04) than in the force condition (46.10). There was no significant difference at vA after ϭ stationary, F(1, 70) ϭ 1.76, MSE ϭ 1,309.23, or at vA after ϭ -5.4 cm/s (F Ͻ 1).
There was a significant interaction between measure and vB after, F(3, 210) ϭ 16.32, MSE ϭ 958.37, p Ͻ .001. Simple effects analysis revealed, as the next sections show, a greater range of means in the force condition than in the resistance condition. Ratings were significantly higher in the resistance condition (40.60) than in the force condition (21.59) when vB after was stationary, F(1, 70) ϭ 18.91, MSE ϭ 2,006.89, p Ͻ .001; significantly higher in the resistance condition (51.94) than in the force condition (42.39) when vB after was 5.4 cm/s, F(1, 70) ϭ 9.36, MSE ϭ 1,024.60, p Ͻ .01; not significantly different when vB after was 10.8 cm/s (means of 51.79 in the force condition and 50.19 in the resistance condition); and significantly higher in the force condition (60.89) than in the resistance condition (52.21) when vB after was 16.2 cm/s, F(1, 70) ϭ 4.89, MSE ϭ 1,615.42, p Ͻ .05.
There was also a significant interaction between measure, vA after, and vB after, F(6, 420) ϭ 3.57, MSE ϭ 203.39, p Ͻ .01. Inspection of means suggests that the effect of vB after in the force condition is roughly constant across values of vA after, but in the resistance condition the range of means for vB after was somewhat greater when vA after was stationary than at the other two values of vA after.
Force condition. There was a significant effect of vA before, F(1, 29) ϭ 28.14, MSE ϭ 689.23, p Ͻ .001, with a higher mean at vA before ϭ 21.6 cm/s (49.36) than at 10.8 cm/s (38.97). There was a significant effect of vA after, F(2, 58) ϭ 4.11, MSE ϭ 217.86, p Ͻ .05. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed a higher mean at vA after ϭ -10.8 cm/s (46.10) than at vA after ϭ stationary (42.23), with the mean for vA after ϭ -5.4 cm/s (44.17) not being significantly different from either of these. There was a significant effect of vB after, Resistance condition. There was a significant effect of vA before, F(1, 41) ϭ 120.99, MSE ϭ 1,061.88, p Ͻ .001, with a higher mean at vA before ϭ 21.6 cm/s (60.03) than at 10.8 cm/s (37.45). There was a significant effect of vA after, F(2, 82) ϭ 22.47, MSE ϭ 453.04, p Ͻ .001. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed a higher mean at vA after ϭ -10.8 cm/s (55.04) than at vA after ϭ stationary (46.29) and vA after ϭ -5.4 cm/s (44.88), which did not differ significantly. There was a significant effect of vB after, F(3, 123) ϭ 9.51, MSE ϭ 801.09, p Ͻ .001. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed a significantly lower mean when vB after was stationary (40.60) than at the other three values, which did not differ significantly (5.4 cm/s ϭ 51.94; 10.8 cm/s ϭ 50.19; 16.2 cm/s ϭ 52.21).
There was a significant interaction between vA after and vB after, F(6, 246) ϭ 3.74, MSE ϭ 240.96, p Ͻ .01. Simple effects analysis revealed significant effects in conformity with the respective main effects in all cases. Ranges of means indicated that the strongest effect of vA after occurred when vB after was stationary, and the strongest effect of vB after occurred when vA after was stationary. This suggests a possible visual salience effect: When one object is stationary, the other object tends to capture the observer's attention, thereby exerting a stronger influence on ratings. This interaction was qualified by a significant interaction involving all three variables, F(6, 246) ϭ 3.04, MSE ϭ 250.57, p Ͻ .01. Inspection of means revealed no violations of the trends in any of the main effects, except that one mean was anomalously high (for the combination of vA before ϭ 10.8 cm/s, vA after ϭ stationary, vB after ϭ 16.2 cm/s). This resulted in a violation of the order of means for vA after at that combination of vA before and vB after. There were no other obvious discrepancies.
Experiment 2: Judgments of Force Exerted by Object B
There was a significant effect of vA before, F(1, 29) There was a significant interaction between vA after and vB after, F(6, 174) ϭ 3.30, MSE ϭ 263.45, p Ͻ .01. Simple effects analysis revealed no violations of the respective main effects. At the nonzero velocities of vB after, the means show a downward trend with increasing velocity when vA after is stationary or -5.4 cm/s and an upward trend with increasing velocity when vA after is -10.8 cm/s. The range of means was not great in any case (about 6 scale points), and there is no obvious interpretation of this trend.
Experiment 2: Judgments of Resistance Exerted by Object B
There was a significant effect of vB after, F(3, 123) ϭ 107.43, MSE ϭ 2,019.10, p Ͻ .001. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed the order stationary (83.73) Ͼ 5.4 cm/s (41.31) Ͼ 10.8 cm/s (26.12) Ͼ 16.2 cm/s (17.75). There was a significant effect of vA before, F(1, 41) ϭ 31.56, MSE ϭ 292.75, p Ͻ .001, with a higher mean at 21.6 cm/s (45.26) than at 10.8 cm/s (39.20). There was a significant effect of vA after, F(2, 82) ϭ 4.47, MSE ϭ 736.79, p Ͻ .05. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed a higher mean at -10.8 cm/s (45.01) than when vA after was stationary (38.84), with -5.4 cm/s not being significantly different from either of these (42.83). This is similar to the result found in Experiment 1. There were no other significant effects.
Experiment 3: Judgment of Force Exerted by Object A
There was a significant main effect of vA before, F (1, 39) Because of the large number of interactions in a four-way ANOVA design, the Bonferroni correction was used and the significance level was set at .005. There was just one significant interaction at this level, between vB before and vB after, F(4, 156) ϭ 7.64, MSE ϭ 196.99, p Ͻ .001. Simple effects analysis revealed significant effects of vB after in line with the direction of the main effect at all values of vB before. There were significant effects of vB before at all values of vB after. At vB after ϭ 8.1 cm/s, F(2, 78) ϭ 6.60, MSE ϭ 255.84, p Ͻ .01. At vB after ϭ 13.5 cm/s, F(2, 78) ϭ 3.98, MSE ϭ 215.41, p Ͻ .05. At vB after ϭ 18.9 cm/s, F(2, 78) ϭ 5.07, MSE ϭ 208.43, p Ͻ .01. When Object B moved slowly after contact, increasing speed before contact was associated with higher force judgments. At the two higher speeds of vB after, increasing speed before contact was associated with lower force judgments. These effects do not appear to be strong, and no difference between means within any of these comparisons exceeded 5 scale points. The corresponding interaction in judgments of force exerted by Object B would be vA before ϫ vA after. That interaction was not significant, as reported in the next section. This suggests that the reliability of this interaction should be established before possible interpretations are proposed. 
